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While mobile hosts are evolving into full-IP enabled devices, there is a greater demand to provide a more flexible, reconfigurable,
and scalable security mechanism in mobile communication systems beyond 3G (B3G). Work has already begun on such an “all-
IP” end-to-end solution, commonly referred to as 4G systems. Fully fledged integration between heterogeneous networks, such
as 2.5G, UMTS, WLAN, Bluetooth, and the Internet, demands fully compatible, time-tested, and reliable mechanisms to depend
on. SSL protocol has proved its eﬀectiveness in the wired Internet and it will probably be the most promising candidate for future
wireless environments. In this paper, we discuss existing problems related to authentication and key agreement (AKA) procedures,
such as compromised authentication vectors attacks, as they appear in current 2/2.5G/3G mobile communication systems, and
propose how SSL, combined with public key infrastructure (PKI) elements, can be used to overcome these vulnerabilities. In this
B3G environment, we perceive authentication as a service, which has to be performed at the higher protocol layers irrespective
of the underlying network technology. Furthermore, we analyze the eﬀectiveness of such a solution, based on measurements of
a “prototype” implementation. Performance measurements indicate that SSL-based authentication can be possible in terms of
service time in future wireless systems, while it can simultaneously provide both the necessary flexibility to network operators and
a high level of confidence to end users.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, there has been an explosive growth in
the mobile phones and generally small wireless handheld de-
vices market. In the years to come, most people will use their
handheld device to make wireless security-sensitive trans-
actions like online banking, stock trading, and shopping. It
is also anticipated that the wireless Internet will have much
more communication partners than the wired. Estimations
show that at the end of 2005 there will be 1.6 billion wire-
less users, and more than 1 billion of them will be 3G mobile
Internet users [1]. All of them will wish to use their devices,
with the optimum radio interface available to the surround-
ing environment, for example, home environment, car, of-
fice, shopping, and so forth (Figure 1).
On the one hand, the underlying network infrastructure
will remain heterogeneous with diﬀerent wired and wireless
technologies. On the other hand, the protocol architecture
of the access networks will be based on Internet protocols;
hence, integration into a homogeneous infrastructure on the
IP layer will be possible. In this environment, it is obvious
that the protection of personal and business data is very im-
portant, while the ultimate goal is seamless interconnection
of diﬀerent wireless and fixed network technologies to pro-
vide eﬃcient, flexible, and secure communication based on
the Internet protocol suite.
Secure sockets layer (SSL) [2, 3, 4, 5] is the predominant
and most widely used security protocol on the wired Inter-
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Figure 1: 4G environment.
Unlike wired networks, to the best of our knowledge, no
wireless data service today oﬀers this protocol on a mo-
bile device. Performance considerations in using SSL in a
resource-constrained environment drove wireless designers
to choose for their mobile clients a gateway oriented secu-
rity protocol called wireless transport layer security (WTLS)
[6, 7]. Provided that it is possible to develop a usable, in terms
of performance, implementation of SSL for a handheld de-
vice as suggested in [8], we can view authentication between
mobile users and network operators as a service which has
to be performed at higher layers. By doing so, we can imple-
ment a more secure, flexible, and reconfigurable authentica-
tion and key agreement (AKA) procedure for next generation
mobile and wireless communication networks [9, 10, 11].
In this paper, we first discuss existing problems related to
AKA procedures in 3G networks and then describe and eval-
uate the performance of a new AKA scenario, which is based
on the SSL protocol and takes advantage of public key infras-
tructure (PKI). We show that SSL-based authentication can
be possible in terms of service time in future mobile systems,
while it can simultaneously provide both the necessary flexi-
bility to network operators and a high level of confidence to
end users.
Section 2 provides an overview of the SSL protocol and
discusses how SSL and PKI can be included in future mobile
communications. In Section 3, we propose and analyze an
AKA mechanism based on SSL, while in Section 4 we eval-
uate the performance of this solution. The paper is finally
concluded in Section 5.
2. INTRODUCING SSL AND PKI INMOBILE
COMMUNICATIONS
SSL establishes a transport-level secure channel for en-
crypted communications, between two parties. In fact, it is a
new security protocol and layer between the application layer
and the transport layer in the Internet protocol suite [12].
Hence, SSL needs a reliable transport protocol like TCP. SSL
is oﬀering many advantages, like diﬀerent applications sup-
port, minimal changes at layers above and below, and is easy
to develop in IP-enabled devices.
SSL provides communications privacy through symmet-
ric encryption and integrity through message authentica-
tion codes (MACs). Both the IETF’s transport-layer security
(TLS) and the WAP forum’s WTLS protocol are direct de-
scendants of SSL.
The successful use of the SSL protocol in the wired Inter-
net has proved its usability and eﬀectiveness. Likewise, SSL
can be part of an all-IP mobile environment [8]. A mobile
device that supports SSL protocol can be used for various
applications, like HTTP, NNTP, and FTP. So it can actively
secure electronic transactions via internet, including those
which require the exchange of private information like pass-
words, PINs, and credit or prepaid card numbers, ensuring
their secure transport through the network, and providing
the subscriber with the essential level of confidence and cer-
tainty.
Furthermore, the necessity for more processing power
and memory has driven smart cards toward more advanced
architectures, all the way to where we are beginning to see
32-bit RISC-based ARM processors in smart cards. These
cards based on modern chips have already appeared in the
market, and they can eﬀectively store and protect the sub-
scriber’s private key, generate good pseudorandom values
and take over symmetric key (un)wrapping functions [8, 13].
The Schlumberger Cyberflex smart card, for example, can
perform 1024 bit RSA operations (both public and private
key) in less than one second. Mobile’s device processor can
eﬃciently carry out the rest of the calculations needed by
SSL protocol. For example, the ASPeCT project has demon-
strated that public-key authentication is possible and global
system for mobile communication (GSM) and universal
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Figure 2: 3G network architecture and PKI elements.
mobile telecommunications system (UMTS) applications
can coexist on a single smart card [14]. A recent study has
also shown the feasibility of SSL in handheld wireless devices
[8], while a relevant work showed that SSL handshake proto-
col time can be improved up to 5.7 times [15].
SSL supports diﬀerent protocols for creating premaster
keys (RSA, Diﬃe-Hellman, etc.), several diﬀerent crypto-
graphic algorithms, and diﬀerent MAC algorithms. In the
context of an AKA procedure, these properties can provide
the appropriate flexibility in a continuously evolving envi-
ronment, where the available means from a perspective of di-
versity and computational power at the attackers side are in-
creasing rapidly. The incorporation of the international mo-
bile subscriber identity (IMSI) transmission and the packet-
temporary mobile subscriber identity (P-TMSI) allocation in
SSL-based AKA far enhances its reliability and oﬀers fewer
opportunities to potential attackers.
Certainly, to implement an AKA mechanism based on
SSL, we need to utilize some sort of PKI, which is not nec-
essarily part of the beyond-3G (B3G) network core [16]
(Figure 2). PKI is gradually being introduced in the mar-
ket. Projects like ASPeCT [14] and USECA [17], Third Gen-
eration Partnership Project (3GPP) discussion documents
[16, 18] especially for UMTS release 6, as well as other recent
works [19] anticipate that evolution. The eNorge 2005 strat-
egy [20] calls for a shared PKI for Norway, while advanced
standards such MexE, WAP, and i-mode from NTT Do-
CoMo have moved forward to introduce public key methods.
Successful wireless PKI implementations and solutions from
companies like Sonera Smarttrust, Lucent Technologies, and
Entrust, strengthens the assertion that PKI has become an
acknowledged and promising component of standards.
Such an infrastructure is protocol independent and het-
erogeneous, and can provide a wide range of security ser-
vices, such as authorization and charging of mobile users for
new services, authenticated and encrypted channels between
network entities, as well as digital signatures and nonrepudi-
ation services.
More specifically, in the context of an AKA implementa-
tion based on SSL, we assume the following.
(i) There is some sort of certification authority (CA),
which issues and revokes certificates. This can be pub-
lic in the form of a common certification service
provider (CSP) or private; one or more per operator.
(ii) UMTS subscriber identity module (USIM) tamper-
resistant card is storing the user’s private and pub-
lic keys, and certificate(s) along with the trusted CA
certificates and IMSI. USIM card should be capa-
ble of generating pseudorandom values and execut-
ing public key operations. For instance, if RSA key ex-
change is being used in MS key-exchange message (see
Section 3.2), the USIM generates a 48 bytes premas-
ter secret and encrypts it under the server’s RSA key
found in server’s certificate. This means that mobile
equipment (ME) has to pass server’s public RSA key
to the USIM. Other operations required by the SSL
protocol have to be supported by the ME. ME should
also have a nonvolatile memory to store P-TMSI and
SSL caching parameters in order to support session re-
sumption discussed in Section 3.3.
(iii) Every network element, which takes part in AKA pro-
cedures, possesses a key pair similar to user’s and the
corresponding digital certificate. AKA functionality
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can be provided by (serving GPRS support node)
SGSNs, (session initiation protocol) SIP Servers or
even Authentication Authorization and Accounting
(AAA) servers. Moreover, these entities track and store
possible CAs Cross reference certificates [13, 16] to
support inter operator(s) authentication and trust.
(iv) There is one-at-least digital certificate repository,
which stores all the digital certificates and is being
managed by the mobile operator’s CA.
3. AN AKAMECHANISM BASEDON SSL
3.1. Existing problems in 3G AKA
In UMTS, the AKA mechanism is somewhat similar to the
authentication in GSM. The idea to use public keys in the
process of authenticating the users was abandoned, mainly
due to backwards compatibility and for performance consid-
erations. The authentication in both systems is based on a
symmetric secret key K, which is stored in the user’s U(SIM)
card and in the corresponding Authentication Centre (AuC)
in which he made his subscription. The procedure, as de-
scribed in [21], is based on the challenge/response protocol.
Several known weaknesses in AKA GSM seem to be now
fixed in UMTS, through further study and investigation.
However, there are still some “gaps” which an attacker can
possibly exploit. Below we briefly describe these weaknesses,
while for a detailed breakdown of 3G-AKA shortcomings re-
fer to [21, 22, 23, 24].
(i) Passive or active attacks can compromise authentica-
tion vectors either from SGSN or home subscriber
server (HSS) which store a number of vectors or quin-
tuplets for each user, or from the SGSN-HSS commu-
nication link. The problem becomes more important
in case the subscriber is roaming between two or more
PLMNs, for example, in diﬀerent countries, where the
home network has always to send authentication vec-
tors for use by the serving network. This means that
the authentication vectors are very likely to become
compromised or spoiled, traveling across diﬀerent net-
works which possibly have dissimilar security features
[22]. In any case, the user will still need to trust each
serving network operator and its security technology
in the same way he does in GSM networks.
(ii) In some cases, the system allows the identification of
a user by means of the permanent subscriber identity
(IMSI) in clear text. The procedure should be invoked
by the serving network when (a) the subscriber regis-
ters for the first time in a serving network, or after a
long time interval in which the mobile station (MS)
has not been used and (b) when the network cannot
retrieve IMSI from P-TMSI, due to SGSN’s database
malfunctions or in handover cases when the (IMSI, P-
TMSI) pair is transmitted from one SGSN to another
and the IP address of the old SGSN cannot be resolved.
The procedure is open to passive attacks, where the
intruder is waiting for potential IMSI transmissions
in clear text or active man-in-the-middle attacks [22].
The unprotected transmission of permanent identity
is primarily a threat against user identity confidential-
ity. But there is also a possibility that the user iden-
tity could be tampered with. However, it is not obvi-
ous how it could be exploited beyond creating general
commotion in the system. Below, we shall examine a
way in which the P-TMSI allocation procedure can be
part of the SSL AKA mechanism.
(iii) The key sizes and the ciphering and deciphering al-
gorithms are fixed. This makes the whole mechanism
inflexible and less secure, whenever security vulnera-
bilities are discovered in an existing algorithm, like in
the case of GSM A5/1 algorithm [25]. Having a dy-
namic security mechanism that is able to negotiate
and load new encryption modules with diﬀerent key
lengths on demand allows greater flexibility.
(iv) One security enhancement in UMTS is the inclusion of
integrity protection service. However, integrity is only
guaranteed for signalling data between RNC and MS.
The user data do not have an associated MAC, and are
consequently vulnerable to manipulation.
(v) In addition to securing mobile communications, the
security mechanisms in mobile devices should be able
to provide security services for multimedia applica-
tions and IP-based services. The challenge is even
greater when mobile communication involves multi-
ple domains in wireless, self-configuring, and hetero-
geneous environments.
Last but not least, user application security, when needed,
is provided by the WTLS protocol. It is well known that
WTLS, at least until version 2.0, is using a WAP gateway,
which is generally considered as insecure and certainly not
“end-to-end.” Moreover, it allows the use of weak encryp-
tion algorithms and features that make chosen-plaintext at-
tacks and brute force attacks easier to mount. At any case,
WTLS authentication procedure is often anonymous, and if
it is done, then it is performed only once (towards the WAP
gateway) for the whole time the same WAP gateway is used.
3.2. AKA based on SSL protocol
As we already discussed, the AKA mechanism is based on
the symmetric key K, which is used by the (common to AuC
and USIM) one-way functions f1 through f5 to compute and
to verify the authentication vectors respectively. Functions f1
and f2 are message authentication functions while f3, f4, and
f5 are key generating functions. For a detailed explanation
of f1 to f5 functions, refer to [21, 24]. The USIM-network
authentication process is mutual as an attempt to enhance
GSM. Despite that, during the authentication process, there
is always the chance for an intruder to use a compromised au-
thentication vector that he has intercepted either from HSS
or from the HSS-SGSN link. If that vector has not been used
again, then the attacker can possibly achieve his goals, using
a false base station (BS) (impersonating the network), or a
false MS (impersonating the user).
An SSL-based AKA mechanism, which includes P-TMSI
allocation, is described hereunder and is depicted in
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Figure 3: AKA mechanism based on SSL (P-TMSI is unknown to SGSN).
(Figure 3). The proposed mechanism can be implemented in
some future time or in AKA dual-mode devices. At this point,
we also suppose that no P-TMSI is included in the MS’s at-
tach request message to SGSN, which serves the routing area
wherein the mobile is located. Later, we will show how the
procedure is extended when P-TMSI is included in the MS’s
attach request message to SGSN.
(i) MS initiates the SSL handshake sending an MS hello
message to SGSN. This includes the MS security op-
tions: the highest version of the SSL protocol that the
MS can support, an ordered preference list of crypto-
graphic and compression parameters that the MS can
sustain, a 32-bit timestamp, a 28-bit random num-
ber, and a session ID. This ID should be empty if no
SSL session currently exists or if the client wishes to
generate new security parameters.
(ii) SGSN replies with its hello message. If it supports
some cryptographic and compression methods com-
mon to MS, those are included in its message. Other-
wise, the connection is terminated. In addition, SGSN
sends its 32-bit and 28-bit numbers and a session ID.
If the latter is equal to the MS session ID, it is implied
that the parties are going to use security parameters
agreed on in a previous session. Otherwise, SGSN gen-
erates a fresh session ID number denoting a new con-
nection.
(iii) SGSN sends its digital certificate to MS. This can be an
X509v3 certificate or an X509v3 subset.
(iv) SGSN sends a key-exchange message to MS. This step
is essential to give theMS a way to verify that the SGSN
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Figure 4: Resuming an SSL session (abbreviated handshake).
(v) MS has to validate the SGSN’s certificate. First, it ver-
ifies that the certificate is published by a CA that it
can trust and that the certificate time-validity period
has not expired. Given that changes on those lists are
rare, a CAs list with their corresponding public keys
can be prestored in the USIM card. It is important
that the procedure uses the public key from its internal
store to verify the certificate, rather than the public key
from the CA certificate, that might be provided by the
SGSN. Finally, it computes the certificate’s hash and
compares it with that existing in the received certifi-
cate. We also assume that there is no need for the MS
to check if SGSN’s certificate has been revoked. This
is true as SGSNs, or authentication servers in general,
administered by the mobile service provider are rela-
tively few and in the order of tenths according to the
size of the network. Considering the provider’s mod-
erately closed network and assuming that the private
key of each SGSN is adequately protected, the follow-
ing options are possible. (a) Each operator can peri-
odically, for example, 12–18 months, refresh SGSN’s
certificates by revoking the old ones. (b) Issued certifi-
cates for SGSN can have a limited life of 12–18months.
After that, they must be replaced with the new ones.
(c) The last option is to replace an SGSN’s certificate
only when the machine operation is suspended or up-
graded. This procedure will still happen quite infre-
quently.
(vi) SGSN requests MS certificate and concludes its part of
the negotiation with a hello done message.
(vii) MS/USIM generates a premaster secret value and en-
crypts it using the SGSN’s public key. Similarly, it en-
crypts its IMSI and sends both values back to SGSN. If
a Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange is performed, the SGSN
and the MS exchange their public parameters as part
of the SGSN key exchange and MS key-exchange mes-
sages.
(viii) MS has to prove that it possesses the private key that
corresponds to the public key, which is included in
the certificate it previously sent to SGSN. The mes-
sage contains a digitally signed hash from the infor-
mation, available to both parties (keys and messages).
This hash will be checked by SGSN.
(ix) SGSN checks the validity of the MS’s certificate carry-
ing all the above-mentioned tests.
(x) SGSN decrypts the premaster secret value and IMSI
using its private key. It also generates P-TMSI.
(xi) Both parties convert the premaster secret into master
secret. The converting procedures may include MD5
& SHA-1 hashes with the session IDs exchanged by
both parties as input parameters. The master key will
be used for ciphering and MAC calculations.
(xii) MS sends change CipherSpec and finished messages
and SGSN replies accordingly. Note that the finished
messages are cryptographically and integrity protected
making use of the previously negotiated parameters.
Finally, P-TMSI is included in the attach accept mes-
sage send from SGSN to MS.
3.3. Resuming a previous session
To minimize the overhead of sophisticated cryptographic
calculations and of a significant number of protocol mes-
sages in both parties, SSL defines a mechanism by which two
parties can reuse previously negotiated SSL parameters. As
Figure 4 shows, resuming earlier sessions notably streamlines
the SSL AKA negotiation. The two hello messages define if
the session can be resumed or not. More specifically, if MS
wishes to resume a previous session, then it includes its ses-
sion ID in theMS hellomessage suggesting its value to SGSN.
If SGSN agrees with that and has cached that session param-
eters, it responds with the same session ID in its own hello
message. Otherwise, it generates a fresh session ID value and
then the full negotiation takes place [4, 12].
The entire attach procedure, incorporating our proposed
SSL AKA procedure, is illustrated in Figure 5, in the form of
a message sequence diagram. The MS retrieves its P-TMSI
from its nonvolatile memory and places it in the attach re-
quest message, sent to the new SGSN. The P-TMSI has been
previously allocated possibly by another SGSN (old SGSN)
and perhaps at another routing area. Obviously, if the P-
TMSI has been allocated by the new SGSN in the past, then
the new SGSN and the old SGSN are identical and the new
SGSN is aware of the IMSI of the MS. A decision flowchart
describing whether session can by resumed or not, is pre-
sented in Figure 6.
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Figure 5: MS’s attach procedure.
Although session resumption oﬀers a great deal of conve-
nience and eﬃciency to both parties involved, systems should
exercise some care in employing it. When a single key is em-
ployed, encryption inevitably becomes less secure, as more
information is protected and the time passes. Potential at-
tackers gain more data to analyze and more time to perform
analysis. So the SGSN has to set thresholds on the number
of resumptions allowed per session, as well as on the time
elapsed between consecutive resumptions per session. If one
of the constraints is not met, then the full negotiation should
be mandatory.
3.4. AKA procedure in a serving network
In case the subscriber is using his mobile device in a for-
eign network, SSL AKA procedure remains as is, with the
assumption that the home network CA and the serving net-
work CA, have pre-exchanged cross reference certificates. In
that case, SGSN is bound to send to MS the corresponding
cross-reference certificate too [16]. Of course, another op-
tion is to have a common root CA, which is acting as a CSP
and is entrusted by both the serving and home network CAs.
3.5. Additional requirements
Some further issues need to be resolved before the proposed
SSL-based authentication is introduced. Currently it is not
possible to implement a straight SSL AKA procedure be-
tween an MS and 2.5G-SGSN, because there is not a direct
IP connectivity between MS and SGSN. However, 3G-SGSN
will eventually communicate towards all directions (RNC,
GGSN) using IP as specified by 3GPP and thus it is very likely
that it will be finally integrated with GGSN, at a later time.
More importantly, regardless which node will provide AKA
functionality, we believe that it is more eﬃcient to imple-
ment the AKA procedure as a service, provided to the user,
irrespective of the access network/domain he is connected to
and the service he is requesting.
For instance, 3GPP AKA is used for authentication pur-
poses at both the radio network and the IP multimedia sub-
system (IM), introduced in UMTS release 5. Moreover, cur-
rent 3GPP specifications for UMTS release 6 describe an in-
terworking architecture between UMTS and WLAN where
the home network is responsible for access control, while
3GPP authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA)
proxy, relays access control signalling to the home 3GPP AAA
server. 3GPP seems to choose the extensible authentication
protocol (EAP)-AKA protocol [26, 27, 28] to support such
interworking scenarios.
In this B3G environment, we perceive authentication as a
service performed at the higher protocol layers irrespective of
the underlying network technology. According to B3G “all-
IP” vision, this technology independent approach will prob-

































If the P-TMSI included in
the attach request message
has been previously
allocated by the new SGSN,
then new SGSN = old SGSN
Figure 6: Checking whether a session can be resumed.
Another issue is that SSL AKA protects eﬀectively user’s
data but leaves signalling communication between RNC and
MS unprotected. In a similar way, as current UMTS specifica-
tions provide ciphering and integrity protection to signalling
traﬃc, the ciphering and integrity keys constructed during
SSL handshake could be used for the protection of only sig-
nalling messages at the lower layers. A mechanism similar
to “the security mode command” message of the radio ac-
cess network application protocol (RANAP) [21] is neces-
sary to transfer these keys to RNC. Ciphering on signalling
data could also be avoided as the critical issue is the integrity
of this data. Additionally, the USIM card must support al-
gorithms f8 and f9 for ciphering and integrity protection of
signalling, respectively.
4. SSL AKA SERVICE TIMEMEASUREMENTS
4.1. Testbed setup
In order to evaluate the performance of the SSL AKA mech-
anism, we constructed an experimental hardware and soft-
ware architecture. The objective was to take measurements
of the AKA procedure and at the same time simulate the
consumption of processing power and communication re-
sources of a real full deployment. We excluded error process-
ing and optional features from our study, because these in-
crease development time without consuming significant ad-
ditional resources.
The development and test model topology is illustrated
in Figure 7. The presumedmobile device is an IBMThinkPad
380 laptop computer that uses Windows 95B operating sys-
tem. The “client” uses a Siemens ME45 mobile phone, in
order to connect to the Internet over GPRS. The IBM 380
incorporates a 150MHz Pentium CPU and has 16MB of
RAM available. Contemporary wireless devices are featur-
ing advanced architectures with Strong-Arm processors up
to 400MHz, memory capacities of 64MB RAM and 48MB
ROM, support for java applications and strong operating sys-
tems. At the other end, the “server” machine has a Pentium
III 733MHz processor with 256MB RAM, running the Win-
dows 2000 Professional SP2 operating system. The server has
also a WAN connection available. Comparable testbeds for
GPRS and WAP performance evaluation can be found in the
literature [29, 30, 31].
Wewrote the applications in C++ and employed the well-
known open-source Apache-style license OpenSSL toolkit in
version 0.9.6g (http://www.openssl.org) [32] to make them
SSL enabled. Lightweight SSL packages like Java 2Micro Edi-
tion (J2ME) kilobyte-SSL from Sun and RSA’s Bsafe SSL-
C/SSL-J, oﬀer certificate-based authentication from server’s
side only. Moreover, it is argued that Java performance in
crypto code is by far worse than C performance [4].
The experimental software architecture is depicted in
Figure 8. Two processes are running on the SSL enabled “au-
thentication server”: process A1, which opens a TCP-SSL
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Figure 8: Software architecture.
listening socket and waits for transactions, and process A2,
which locally generates a large number of SSL transactions
and loads the local-host server. The interarrival times be-
tween successive SSL authentication requests, generated by
process A2, follow the negative exponential distribution. Ap-
plication server process A1 is multithreaded.When it receives
a message, it dispatches a thread to process and respond to
the request.
We tried to minimize client’s application demand in pro-
cessing power and memory capacity by removing dispens-
able memory and power consuming calls to OpenSSL func-
tions. Therefore, we left out functions that load libraries
with error strings, and verify certificates paths and certifi-
cates chain depths above four, and we enabled the client to
support only SSL version 3 and TLS version 1. Moreover, we
excluded from the client and the server, support for ciphers
and MACs algorithms that are generally considered anony-
mous or weak, for example, MD5.
The handshake and authentication procedures are mu-
tual, meaning that both the client (MS) and the server
(SGSN) exchange their certificates, which are kept locally
with the corresponding trusted CAs public keys list. We de-
cided to evaluate a depth-two certificate chain schema in or-
der to weigh up a serving network authentication by stretch-
ing the client even more. As shown in Figure 9, our certifi-
cate “tree” includes a root CA, a server CA, and a client CA.
Diﬀerent service providers may operate client CA and server
CA accordingly. Root CA certificate is self-signed. Similarly,
root CA signs server CA and client CA certificates. Client
holds a certificate signed by client CA, whereas server CA
signs server’s certificate.
We used a standard X.509 certificate format that con-
tained the following custom fields: country name, state or
province name, locality name, organization name, organiza-
tion unit name, common name, email address. Additionally,
we used two more optional (attribute) fields: optional com-
pany name and optional common name. Common name or
subject field that serves as the client’s distinguished name was
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Figure 9: Certificate tree.
Both parties check certificates validity, against time expi-
ration, issuing CA and IP address. An implementation must
not only ensure that the certificate is valid, but must also
make sure that it certifies the right party. Since a certificate
binds a public key with a distinguished name, the “natural”
option is to use a unique ID, like IMSI, in the common name
field. Of course this will reveal the real identity of the user. In
the following, we will present a way to avoid this.
It is well known that CSPs are capable and liable to is-
sue “anonymous” X.509 certificates, which means that the
common name field can contain any pseudonym. The map-
ping of pseudonyms to IMSIs is known only to that particu-
lar CSP and a potential eavesdropper cannot derive the real
identity of the subscriber. Even if an attacker compromises
both the subscriber certificate and TMSI, he still cannot be
SSL AKA authenticated, as he will not be able to prove (to
SGSN) that he holds the private key that corresponds to that
certificate’s public key. This is true because it is infeasible to
create the right certificate verify message (Figure 3 and (viii)
in Section 3.2).
No party checks certificates validity against any fresh re-
vocation list. Only the authentication server is bound to do
so by checking against MS’s IMSI. This will require an IMSI
revocation list transferred from HSS to SGSNs. Having that
an IMSI has a relatively long life, this list can be transferred
once a day during nonpeak hours. In the meantime, if IMSI
has been revoked but is not included in the last list received,
the handshake will successfully start. However, when SGSN
sends an update location message to HSS, it will receive an
invalid IMSI response, denoting that the specific IMSI has
been revoked.
All RSA keys are 1024 bits in length, premaster secret ex-
change is based on ephemeral Diﬃe-Hellman key with RSA
signatures, thus supporting forward secrecy and the result-
ing symmetric SSL session key is 128 bits long. The complete
cipher suite algorithms that our applications employed are
EDH-RSA for key exchange with key size 512 or 1024 bits,
DES-CBC3 for encryption, and HMAC-SHA-1 for integrity
(EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA).
4.2. Measurement results
We run our experiments with various values of the request
arrival rate λ for process A2, which adds virtual load to the
server process A1, during diﬀerent days and times. The gen-
eral packet radio service (GPRS) coding scheme was CS1
(9.05 Kbps) and the time slots for GPRS were varying from 3
to 4, thus having wireless network speeds in the range from
27 to 36Kbps. We tracked and measured the following times
in the mobile’s client process.
(a) Network response time (NRT): time to complete a
connection to the server socket. It includes network
roundtrip plus client and server processing related to
the acceptance of the connection.
(b) Request preparation time (RPT): elapsed time before
the actual SSL handshake. This time is the NRT, plus
the preparation time, for example, MS’s time to load
the certificates.
(c) Total handshake time (THT): elapsed time from MS
hello to finished message.
(d) Total SSL call setup time (TST): total elapsed time until
both parties acquire the symmetric key and are ready
to start the actual communication (it includes RPT
and THT).
At the server side, we measured the following time.
(e) Time to serve client’s request (SCRT): elapsed time from
server hello message until MS’s request has been ac-
cepted and served.
During our experiments, we gathered 1000 measurements of
the aforementioned times, from an equal number of trans-
actions initiated by our client. We present the corresponding
average values in milliseconds in Table 1 and the probability
density functions of these time durations in Figures 10 and
11.
In Figure 10, we can see the relation between NRT and
RPT. We easily observe that RPT plot is actually a right shift
of about 0.03 second, of the NRT plot, which means that the
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Table 1: Average service times in milliseconds.
Mobile station Authentication server
NRT RPT THT TST SCRT
803 833 6858 7684 6133























Figure 10: Service times 1/2.
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Figure 11: Service times 2/2.
preparation process takes nearly constant time to complete
and the total time before SSL handshake is mainly dependent
on the distribution of NRT, that is, the network speed.
Similarly, in Figure 11 we present the relation between
TST, THT, and SCRT. We notice that the THT plot is a right
shift of about 0.7 second of the SCRT plot. This 0.7 second
is actually the MS’s time to prepare, for example, the request
and to load the certificates, plus half round trip time (0.4 sec-
ond) from the initial MS hello. TST has nearly the same dis-
tribution, as the NRT and RPT of the previous figure. This
can be explained from the protocol’s 10 exchanged messages,
in other words, approximately 5 NRTs. Therefore, 803 mil-
liseconds average round trip time multiplied by 5 equals 4
second, plus other times for calculations, verifications, and
hashing, we get the total average SSL setup time of 7.7 sec-
onds. We note that all measurements gathered were highly
immune to server’s workload as this was generated by pro-
cess A2.
Finally, Table 2 shows the resources in kilobytes, which
comprise indicative values for a mobile device to run our sce-
nario.
4.3. Remarks on themeasurements results
We believe that the average time of 7.7 seconds can be,
under certain circumstances discussed hereunder, an ac-
cepted authentication time duration for the user of a wire-
less B3G device. Comparing our work with other works,
we can mention the following. First, comparing TST with
actual WTLS service times, we note that WTLS is in sev-
eral cases even slower, while comparable results with kilo-
byte SSL, 20MHz Palm client CPU, and server side only
certificate verification showed a time of approximately 10
seconds [8]. Second, to the best of our knowledge, two
other works describe and measure public key-based authen-
tication mechanisms for 3G mobile devices. The first one
[33] discusses an alternant to SESAME architecture called
Tiny SESAME. SESAME extends Kerberos by providing addi-
tional services. Performance measurements using an HP Jor-
nada 680 with a 133MHz CPU running Windows CE 2.11
and a version of Tiny SESAME in PersonalJava, showed 10-
to-16 second client authentication times depending on the
call setup scheme. The other one [34] uses proxy assisted
Kerberos protocol architecture between the client and the
server. Measurements using a Vadem Clio C-1000 with a
100MHz CPU running Windows CE and applications writ-
ten in C++ showed 8-to-15 second client authentication
times depending on the scenario architecture and network
speed.
Regarding our results we can also mention the following.
(i) We have to take into account that the network speeds
for 3G will be 144Kbps up to 348Kbps for wide and
up to 2Mb/s for low coverage and mobility, which will
substantially reduce round trip times. A rough calcula-
tion assuming 144Kbps network speed could diminish
NRT to 200.8ms showing an improvement of a factor
of four.
(ii) A higher GPRS coding scheme, if oﬀered by the
operator and possible by the prevailing link con-
ditions, could improve protocol’s handshake perfor-
mance considerably [31].
(iii) We have also to subtract the extra network delay, de-
rived from the fact that our server did not reside in-
side the provider’s core network. Performing measure-
ments with a ping tool we discovered that the average
extra time spend in each roundtrip was about 200 mil-
liseconds.
(iv) Someone has to consider that the exchanged certifi-
cates provide for authentication in a serving network.
In present 2.5 and 3G specifications, this means that
the serving network has to ask the subscriber’s home
network to provide it with authentication vectors to
authenticate the user. A real 2.5G standard AKAmech-
anism, assuming that someone activates his device in
a roaming network, takes about 5–7 seconds to com-
plete.
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Table 2: Memory recourses in kilobytes.
Item Kilobytes
RAM space for process A1 2662
Disk or EPROM space for OpenSSL .dll files 1064
Disk or EPROM space for MS’s application program 96.2
EPROM space in chipcard for client’s certificate (.pem file) 2.93
EPROM space in chipcard for one trusted CA-root certificate (.pem file) 1.89
Excluding hardware improvements, further optimiza-
tions may come from either the protocol structure (messages
exchange) or the network architecture. As we discussed in
Section 3.3, session resumption option provides a dramatic
performance improvement. That is because resumed sessions
use the master secret from a previous connection, thus re-
ducing the computation load and the number of messages.
Testing with 512-bit RSA keys shows a performance improve-
ment of a factor of 20 only in the handshake. An even larger
improvement can be observed with larger keys [4]. More im-
portant, we would consequently expect corresponding im-
provement in network throughput, as a significant number
of sessions are resumed. Recent studies also showed that ses-
sion reuse could be further improved, using an SSL session
aware dispatcher, when the operator is planning to install a
cluster of SSL authentication servers [35], and as mentioned
in Section 2, the SSL’s handshake protocol time can be im-
proved up to 5.7 times [15].
Another important thing is that during the SSL hand-
shake, the servermust wait for a clientmessage and vise versa.
OpenSSL, for example, can buﬀer network output for in-
creased performance. So, it is often computationally cheaper
and network faster (considering round-trip times and sizes
of messages exchanged) to generate a number of messages
and transmit them all at once using a buﬀer at the transmit-
ting side [4]. Regardless the buﬀer size, it is also possible that
the data may be quite large and should be segmented in more
than one TCP segments.
Finally, two recent works [36, 37] on battery consump-
tion of mobile devices with comparable testbeds and using
the SSL protocol, show that energy utilization can be ade-
quately controlled.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
The AKAmechanism, as described by 3GPP, is based onGSM
AKA and it was designed to correct known GSM’s prob-
lems and weaknesses. As we already discussed, and until the
providers improve their inter/intra-networks security, there
are still some “weak points” which potential intruders can
exploit. However, the greater drawback of the existing pro-
cedure is that it cannot oﬀer a dynamic and flexible AKA
mechanism, acting rather statically, and facing the problem
shortsightedly. On the contrary, more flexible, dynamic, and
scalable security mechanisms are necessary in order to sup-
port on-demand services and all-IP end-to-end solutions, in-
tegrated with Internet environment and heterogeneous wire-
less and wired technologies. SSL AKA mechanism can be
used to overcome these ineﬃciencies providing real end-to-
end security and importing the benefits of PKI in future mo-
bile communication systems.
In this paper, we perceive authentication as a service and
propose an SSL-based authentication scenario for future mo-
bile communication systems that takes advantage of PKI and
protects user’s IMSI. We examined and evaluated its per-
formance focusing on handshake protocol. We showed that
SSL-based authentication can be possible, in terms of service
time, while it can simultaneously deliver the appropriate flex-
ibility and scalability to network operators and a high level of
trust and assurance to end users.
Topics to be further investigated include roaming and
authentication, cross-reference certificates to support inter-
network authentication, and battery consumption.
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